As the Iranian public eagerly awaits the lifting of internet censorship, hopes were recently dashed when the Minister of Communications, in a conversation with reporters on Wednesday, delayed any concrete action. He vaguely promised changes in the “near future” but offered no specific timeline, leaving many disappointed.
The regime’s stance on internet censorship has been staunchly defended by Kayhan newspaper, the official mouthpiece of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In a recent editorial, the newspaper labeled those calling for the removal of censorship as “Western sympathizers” aiming to “open the door to corruption.” This reflects the government’s hardline position, one that has drawn both domestic and international criticism.
Expectations of Change Under President Pezeshkian
Supporters of Iran regime’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, had hoped that his administration would prioritize lifting restrictions on internet access. Many believed that with a single directive, Pezeshkian could return Iran’s internet environment to a more open state. However, this optimism was quickly tempered.
In the first meeting of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace on October 1, rather than taking steps toward removing censorship, Pezeshkian ordered a report on the country’s internet status. The move surprised even state-controlled media, with Shargh newspaper describing the president’s approach as “unbelievable.” Expectations were high that the new administration would act swiftly, but instead, the public was met with further delays.
Disappointment from the Press
The Ham Mihan newspaper voiced its dissatisfaction, calling Pezeshkian’s statements “disappointing.” In an editorial, the paper noted: “Public opinion was awaiting news about the removal of filtering, but instead, they were met with criticism of VPNs.” This sentiment reflects the frustration of many Iranians, who expected a faster resolution to the censorship issue.
Adding to the confusion, on Wednesday, the regime’s Minister of Information and Communications Technology once again privately discussed the filtering issue, urging the public to be patient. He emphasized that “a hasty approach may not yield the desired results” and alluded to a forthcoming technical report for the Supreme Council of Cyberspace. For many, this felt like just another delay.
Calls for Transparency
On September 25, Ham Mihan pointed out that there are hidden factors behind the delay, asking: “It would be good to clearly explain the situation. At least then people would know where or who the obstacles are.” This call for transparency was echoed by Farhikhtegan on October 10, which urged the government to reveal the reasons behind the continued censorship. According to the newspaper, opposition from “certain institutions” and “a number of upstream requirements” are the primary barriers. These “upstream” requirements, it explained, stem from the mission of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, which was formed under the direction of Khamenei.
The Role of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace
Despite attempts by state media to portray the president and the Minister of Communications as the key decision-makers regarding internet censorship, the real power lies elsewhere. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established on March 3, 2012, by Khamenei’s decree, was created to “organize and manage developments in cyberspace.” The council includes both appointed and elected members, with the president serving as its head.
However, the council’s real power rests with members appointed directly by Khamenei, who serve four-year terms. In 2015, Khamenei outlined ten key objectives for the council, including accelerating the establishment of a National Information Network and promoting Iranian-Islamic values while preventing “cultural and social intrusions.” These objectives form a significant barrier to lifting internet censorship, as they are designed to protect the regime from perceived threats in cyberspace.
Khamenei has repeatedly referred to the virtual world as a “battlefield” and criticized the “unrestricted” nature of the internet, calling for tighter control. As a result, the president, despite his position as head of the council, does not have the authority to unilaterally remove filtering. He must work closely with Khamenei, as well as the country’s security and military institutions.
A Technical Solution to a Political Problem?
When the Minister of Communications speaks of forming a technical group and developing a plan to lift filtering, it is clear that these efforts are aimed at gaining the approval of Khamenei and security institutions. The political and military elites have long been the gatekeepers of Iran’s internet policies, ensuring that the regime’s control over information remains tight.
In the past two years, especially after the 2022 protests, restrictions on social media have intensified. These measures have severely impacted internet-based businesses, many of which have either shut down or suffered significant financial losses. While official figures on the number of blocked websites are unavailable, state media reports that at least 50% of crucial global websites—including Google, Facebook, Apple, TikTok, and Amazon—are filtered, cutting off access to critical resources for millions of Iranians.
Iran’s Poor Global Ranking in Internet Freedom
Among the world’s top 100 economies, Iran ranks lowest in terms of free internet access. The country is also ranked 90th out of 100 in an index measuring internet disruptions and speed. An estimated 40% of Iranian users experience slow or disrupted connections when trying to access the 5,000 most-visited websites, while in 50 other countries, this figure is less than 6%.
The Tehran Electronic Commerce Association has pointed to filtering equipment as the primary cause of Iran’s poor internet quality, stating that it is the “most significant factor in reducing the quality of Iran’s internet and the main obstacle to network development.”
The Role of the VPN Mafia
While regime officials continue to debate the future of internet censorship, a lucrative underground economy has flourished. Many Iranians now rely on VPNs (virtual private networks) to bypass censorship. According to the Minister of Communications, two-thirds of mobile phone users use VPNs to access filtered content, and state media estimates that 84% of mobile users are using VPNs to access social media platforms and websites.
This burgeoning VPN market, worth an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 billion tomans annually, has attracted the attention of both parliamentarians and the media. Recent reports indicate that the relatives and children of high-ranking regime officials are profiting from this underground economy, further complicating efforts to lift filtering.
Mostafa Nakhai, a member of parliament, recently told Etemad newspaper that the VPN market operates as a mafia, blocking attempts to remove filtering in order to protect their profits. This, combined with the regime’s entrenched security concerns, has created a complex web of interests that makes resolving the censorship issue even more difficult.
